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Abstract
The Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act has been in
place for ten years.1 Although the statement of purpose in the Act itself
is terse,2 the Florida Supreme Court, reviewing the constitutionality of
the Act, gave an enumeration of “permissible legislative objectives.”
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Introduction
The Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act has been in
place for ten years.1 Although the statement of purpose in the Act itself
is terse,2 the Florida Supreme Court, reviewing the constitutionality of
the Act, gave an enumeration of "permissible legislative objectives." s
Most important among these was the intent to reduce fault-based automobile accident litigation and to facilitate the timely compensation of
auto accident victims for out-of-pocket losses. 4 In the main, the Act has
* Assistant Professor and Associate Dean, Florida State University College of
Law. LL.M., Yale, 1977; J.D., University of Florida, 1973; B.A., Florida State University, 1965. I thank my colleagues, Larry George and Ken Vinson, for their assistance
and encouragement.
1. Fla. Stat. § § 627.730-.741 (1971), effective January 1, 1972, to be repealed
July 1, 1982.
2. FLA. STAT. § 627.731 (1979) provides:
The purpose of § § 627.730-627.741 is to require medical, surgical, funeral
and disability insurance benefits to be provided without regard to fault
under motor vehicle policies that provide bodily injury and property
damage liability insurance, or other security, for motor vehicles registered
in this state and, with respect to motor vehicle accidents, a limitation on
the right to claim damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and
inconvenience.
3. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 1974); Chapman v.
Dillon, 1982 Fla. Law Weekly 133 (Fla. 1982).
4. 296 So. 2d at 16. A study by the United States Department of Transportation,
completed in 1970, disclosed that auto accidents contributed more than 200,000 cases a
year to the nation's court load, and consumed 17% of the country's judicial resources.
[Reported in Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Commerce Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1970)]. (Hereinafter cited as Commerce Comm. Report.)
A study of 1,000 bodily injury claims conducted by the Department of Insurance
for the State of New York disclosed that one out of four people injured in auto accidents recovered nothing under the fault-based compensation system. STATE OF NEW
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met these objectives.5
Amendments of the Act in the intervening years have significantly
reduced no-fault benefits.6 The question whether the reduced benefits

YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE...

FOR WHOSE BENEFIT?,

A Report to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1970, at 18. (Hereinafter cited as Rockefeller Report). "[V]ictims . . . face[d] average delays in collecting under auto liability
insurance that [were] ten times as long as delays in collecting under collision, homeowners, or burglary insurance and forty times as long as delays under accident and
health insurance." Id. at 19. On the average it took 15.8 months to settle liability
claims, and at the end of three years, 12% of claims remained unpaid. Id. at n.26.
Other objectives of the Act enumerated by the Lasky court included the reduction
of automobile insurance premiums and inefficiency in the liability insurance industry;
reduction in public relief rolls; remedy of the inequities in the traditional tort compensation system, whereby minor claims were overcompensated and major claims were
undercompensated relative to their true economic value; and remedy of the pressure
brought to bear upon an injured party to "accept an unduly small settlement of his
claims [to meet] the pressing necessity of paying medical bills. . . . " 296 So. 2d at 16.
That these were worthy objectives is well documented. Under the traditional tort
system, victims whose economic losses were more than $25,000 only recovered about a
third of their losses, while those with losses of less than $500 recovered an average of
four and a half times their economic loss. Commerce Comm. Report at 4-5. Of each
dollar paid into the system for liability protection, only forty cents went to compensate
accident victims. Commerce Comm. Report at 21. From 1960 to July 1970, the cost of
auto insurance went up sixty-five percent while the take-home pay for nonsupervisory
and factory workers during the same period went up only forty percent. Id. at 23.
5. See J. Little, No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida:An Empirical Examination of Some of Its Effects, 9 U. MICH. J. LAW REFORM 1 (1975). Professor Little
reported a significant reduction in the time elapsing between accidents and the first
receipt of no-fault benefits, and a settling of claims in amounts much closer to verified
medical losses than under the common law system. Id. at 4. "[C]overage for personal
injury benefits was expanded and the cost of processing claims was reduced." Id. at 5.
"[T]he Florida [no-fault] system can reduce the frequency of personal injury litigation
measurably." Id. at 3.
6. The 1971 Act provided 100% of medical expenses and 85-100% of lost income,
less deductibles. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1)(1971). It required $5000 of PIP insurance
with a maximum deductible of $1000. FLA. STAT. § 627.739 (1971). Changes in 1976
eliminated the $1000 threshold leaving a threshold based on type of injury. (If one did
not meet the severity-of-injury threshold, one could not sue at common law, but had to
rely exclusively upon no-fault benefits). FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1979). The 1977
changes included the elimination of compulsory liability insurance; reduction in nofault medical benefits from 100% to 80%, and reduction in income replacement from
80% to 60% of the lost income. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1979). An injured party may
recover the balance in a common law tort action. See FLA. STAT. § 627.737(1) (1979).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss2/3

2

Russo: Florida No-Fault Insurance: Ten Years of Judicial Interpretation
No Fault Insurancein Florida

6:1982

2431

provide an adequate alternative to rights taken away by the original
legislation (principally, the right to recover for pain and suffering) has
recently been addressed by the Florida Supreme Court.7 This article
does not review the constitutionality of the Act, as it is probable that
no-fault, in one form or another, is here to stay.8 Rather, I examine a
number of specific cases and issues decided under the Act, highlighting
the patterns and irregularities found in courts' interpretations of the
Act and suggesting instances where the irregularities warrant attention.
This article covers three broad areas: (1) the availability of nofault benefits to those injured in or by a vehicle which was not a statutorily defined "motor vehicle"; (2) the availability of no-fault benefits
to those injured in an insured vehicle, who own, or live with one who.
owns, an uninsured vehicle, and the availability of benefits to those injured in uninsured vehicles; and (3) the availability of benefits to those
who constructively "own" an uninsured vehicle.

Vehicles Not Statutorily Defined as "Motor Vehicles"
The availability of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits9 to
The 1978 changes increased no-fault benefits to $10,000 (from $5000), expressly applied the Act to commercial vehicles, tightened the tort threshold to further limit common law suits, and increased the maximum allowable deductible to $8000. FLA. STAT.
§ 627.739(1) (1979).
7. The Florida Supreme Court recently declared the Act constitutional. Although the no-fault benefits have been reduced from 100% of medical expense to 80%,
from 80% of lost wages to 60%, and the permissible deductible has been increased to
$8,000, the court found the provisions of section 627.737 still provide a reasonable
alternative to the traditional tort action and thus do not violate the right of access to
courts. Chapman v. Dillon, 1982 Fla. Law Weekly 133 (Fla. 1982).
8. See P. Atiyah, No Fault Compensation"A Question That Will Not Go Away,

54

TULANE

L.

REV.

271 (1980).

The frequency of accidents alone would suggest the permanency of no-fault repartions. Everyone has accidents. Statistics compiled by the Department of Insurance for
the State of New York showed that after twenty years of driving, 99% of drivers had at
least one accident, and an average driver has a 50% chance of an accident every three
years. Rockefeller Report at 3. This is not surprising; for each mile driven, a driver
must make 200 observations and 20 decisions, and the average driver makes an error in
judgment every two miles. Commerce Comm. Report at 23.
9. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) (1979) provides:
(4) BENEFITS; WHEN DUE (d) The insurer of the owner of a motor
vehicle shall pay personal injury protection benefits for: 1. Accidental bod-
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those injured in or by a vehicle which was not a statutorily defined
"motor vehicle"10 may be derived from five important decisions:""
Negron v. Travelers Insurance Co., 2 Camacho v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,"3 Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Co. (both the district court and
supreme court decisions), 4 and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Castanga15 a supreme court case which is out of step with all that had
gone before. The disharmony between the Supreme Court's opinion in
Heredia and its opinion in Lumbermens emerges from an analysis
which must begin with Negron.
Negron, an employee of the United States Post Office, was injured
when the government's tractor-trailer, which he was driving in the
scope of his employment, was struck by a private passenger automobile.
The court allowed Negron to recover PIP benefits from the insurer of
his personal automobile (which was not involved in the accident), reasoning that (1) Negron was not an occupant of a "motor vehicle" as
that term is defined in the Act;16 (2) Negron's injury was "caused by
physical contact with a motor vehicle";17 therefore (3) Negron was enily injury sustained in this state by the owner while occupying a motor
vehicle, or while not an occupant of a motor vehicle ... if the injury is
caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle.

10. FLA. STAT. § 627.732(1) (1977):
"Motor vehicle" means a sedan, stationwagon, or jeep-type vehicle not
used as a public livery conveyance for passengers and includes any other
four-wheel motor vehicle used as a utility automobile and a pickup or
panel truck which is not used primarily in the occupation, profession, or
business of the insured.
This definition was changed. Ch. 78-374 § 2, 1978 Fla. Laws 1042. See note 58 infra.
11. See also Cavalier Ins. Corp. V. Myles, 347 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) in which Cavalier attempted to deny PIP benefits because the car that
struck its insured was registered in another state. The court held that a vehicle registered in another state is a "motor vehicle" nonetheless, and awarded PIP benefits. Id.
at 1062.
12. 282 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
13. 310 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
14. 346 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) and 358 So. 2d 1353 (Fla.
1978).
15. 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979).
16. 282 So. 2d at 29.
17. Id. at 30.
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titled to recover."8
The court supported its conclusion that Negron was not an occupant of a "motor vehicle" by considering the statutory definition of the
term and an administrative interpretation of the statute by the Department of Insurance."9 The court rejected the Department's administrative interpretation, which reasoned that because Negron was the occupant of a vehicle not statutorily defined as a "motor vehicle," the
coverage of the Act did not apply to him.20
The court opined: "[W]e take the words

'...

if the injury is

caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle' to mean if the injury
results from a collision with a motor vehicle."21 The court did not require that Negron himself come into actual physical contact with a
motor vehicle because it felt such a construction would be "technical,"
and out of keeping with the ordinary meaning of the language of the
Act. 2 By so holding, the court declined to limit the benefits of Section
627.736(4)(d)4 to pedestrians-a limitation the legislature may have
intended, because the Act was later amended to make benefits available to one injured "while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle"
rather than "while not an occupant of a motor vehicle." 23
In Camacho,24 the plaintiff was injured when the truck he owned
and was driving collided with another truck. Like Negron, he applied
18. Id.
19.

Id. at 29.

20. Id. at 30.
21.

Id. (emphasis added).

22. Id. For other cases in which PIP benefits were awarded to passengers injured
in a vehicle which was not a statutorily defined "motor vehicle", see Gateway Ins. Co.
v. Butler, 293 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)(passenger in a "public conveyance" injured when it was struck by an automobile); and State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Butler, 340 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)(passenger in a "utility
vehicle used in transporting passengers for hire" injured when it hit an automobile). In
both cases, PIP benefits were paid by the insurers of the automobiles involved because
the passengers in the commercial vehicles did not own a car. Thus they had no insurance from which they could collect on a first-party basis. See also Greyhound Rent-ACar, Inc. v. Carbon, 327 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) in which the court
held that a rental car is a "motor vehicle," thus allowing those injured in it to recover
PIP benefits.
23. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 340 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Ch. 77-468 § 33, 1977 Fla. Laws 2076.
24. 310 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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for PIP benefits from the insurer of his personal auto. Unlike Negron,
the trial and appellate courts denied coverage.25
The appellate court supported its decision by emphasizing that
"the plaintiff [was] operating a truck used primarily in his business
[and] was involved in an accident with another truck which counsel
stipulated was a 'commercial vehicle.' ",26 "Due to the stipulation of
counsel.

. .

it is undisputed that the plaintiff was involved with a vehi-

cle which is not a motor vehicle
as defined in the Florida Automobile
27
Reparations (No-Fault) Act."1
Why the court attached so much significance to counsel's stipulation is unclear. Counsel merely stipulated a commercial vehicle was
involved; this is not tantamount to a conclusion of law that the commercial vehicle was not a motor vehicle as defined in the Act. 28 The
Act's definition of "motor vehicle" includes "a pickup or panel
truck . .,." What the definition does not include is "a pickup or
panel truck which is

. .

. used primarily in the occupation, profession,

or business of the insured."30
Camacho, like Negron, sustained injury "while not an occupant of
a motor vehicle" (because he was occupying a "truck used primarily in
the occupation, profession, or business of the insured"). And because
Camacho's injury was caused by physical contac 3 1 with a truck used
primarily in the occupation, profession, or business of the owner, not of
the insured, it would appear to be caused by physical contact with a
"motor vehicle." Like Negron, Camacho should have recovered under
the benefits section of the Act which provides:
The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal
injury protection benefits for: 1. Accidental bodily injury sustained
in this state by the owner while occupying a motor vehicle, or while
not an occupant of a motor vehicle if the injury is caused by physi25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
supra.

Id. at 332.
Id. at 331.
Id.
For the definition of "motor vehicle", see note 10 supra.
310 So. 2d at 331.
Id.
See the discussion of "physical contact" in text accompanying notes 21-23
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32
cal contact with a motor vehicle.

This reasoning may seem strained, but in the concurring opinion in
Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Co.,33 Judge Carroll suggested such an
analysis to the Florida Supreme Court;34 the court apparently adopted
it.3 5

In Heredia, the Third District Court of Appeal held that an injured pedestrian, hit by a panel truck used primarily in the business of
its corporate owner, could not recover PIP benefits from his family's
auto insurer.38 The concurring judge reluctantly followed precedent he
had approved in earlier cases, 7 but admitted the earlier cases might
have been wrong, because the statutory definition of motor vehicle excluded only vehicles "used primarily in the occupation, profession, or
business of the insured."3 8 Since the pedestrian was not injured by a

motor vehicle used in his own business (the business of the insured pedestrian), he should recover his statutory first-party insurance benefits.39 The concurring judge believed the majority members were reading the statute as if it exempted vehicles "used primarily in the
occupation, profession, or business of the owner,"' an inappropriate
32. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) (1971) (emphasis added). This provision was
amended in 1977. See note 58 infra.
33. 346 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
34. Id.. at 1231-32. Judge Carroll called into question the wisdom of the Camacho decision:
[H]aving been a member of the panels of this court which decided Camacho . . . although I now see some justification for appellant's argument
that the language of the statute does not support the result reached. . . , I
concur in this court's judgment of affirmance based on the authority of
Camacho . . . , with the decision in this case being certified as one of
public interest, whereby the Supreme Court of Florida will have jurisdiction to review the decision, on certiorari.
Id. at 1232.
35. 358 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Fla. 1978).
36. The Act provides PIP benefits for statutorily defined relatives living in the
same household with the insured. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) 3 (1979).
37. Camacho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 310 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
and Saborit v. Deliford, 312 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. ,1975).
38. 346 So. 2d at 1251 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 1232.
40. Id. at 1231 (emphasis in original).
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judicial revision where the legislation is clear.41
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning of Judge
Carroll's concurring opinion. It read the statute literally, reversed the
district court, and awarded Heredia his PIP benefits.' 2 The court noted
that the legislature expressly exempted vehicles used in the business of
the insured.'3 If the legislature had intended to exempt vehicles used in
the business of the owner it would have said so.44 Thus the pedestrian
was injured by a motor vehicle and could recover under the Act.
The opinion reversing Herediadid not mention the Camacho decision, even though the majority in the district court had relied upon it.
But impliedly, the Camacho decision was wrong, for it held that the
Act did not apply to commercial vehicles. 4'5 At a minimum, the supreme court opinion in Heredia holds that the Act applies to a pedestrian hit by a commercial vehicle.
Putting Heredia and Negron together, one might expect the occupant of a commercial vehicle (Negron) hit by a commercial vehicle
(Heredia) to recover. Not so.
In Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Castagna,'6 Castagna
was injured when his van, which he used primarily in his business, was
struck by a lunch truck. The lunch truck had collided moments before
with a Chevrolet automobile. Castagna sought PIP benefits from his
own insurer, 47 Lumbermens, who denied coverage, claiming the in41. Id. at 1232.
42. 358 So. 2d at 1355.
43. Id.
44. The court notes that "[t]he Legislature ... also employed the term 'owner'
throughout the same statute, in a variety of contexts. In the face of this selectivity,
courts generally are not free to replace one term with the other. . . ." Id.
45. Another case in which PIP benefits were awarded to a pedestrian hit by a
commercial vehicle is Century Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Fillmore, 306 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974), which was expressly overruled by Camacho. Camacho, 310 So.
2d at 332. Because the supreme court decision in Heredia agrees with Century on the
same facts, and because Century was expressly overruled by Camacho, impliedly Camacho was incorrectly decided. On the other hand, it may be possible to distinguish
Camacho because, while Century and Heredia involved a pedestrian and a commercial
vehicle, Camacho involved two commercial vehicles.
46. 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979).
47. Id. at 349.
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'4 8
sured's injuries were not incurred "while occupying a motor vehicle"
49
vehicle."
motor
a
with
contact
physical
by
and were not "caused
Instead of deciding whether Castagna had been injured by physical contact with a "motor vehicle," the lunch truck, (a question the
supreme court in Heredia would have answered in the affirmative because the lunch truck was not owned by the insured), the court discussed whether the injury was "caused by physical contact" with the
Chevrolet. 50 Having focused on the wrong issue, the court concluded
that the physical contact with the Chevrolet was too remote to meet the
traditional proximate cause requirements of tort law, which of course is
true, but irrelevant.5 1 The court stated, without analysis, that "[tihe
Chevrolet is a 'motor vehicle'
within the statutory definition. The van
52
and lunch truck are not."
The conclusion that the lunch truck is not a "motor vehicle" di-

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 350.
51. A discussion of proximate cause is not totally out of place in the context of
the No-Fault Act. For example, see Royal Indemnity Co. v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 307 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) in which a woman sitting on a
park bench was injured when a moving vehicle struck a parked vehicle and the parked
vehicle struck her. The insurer of the parked vehicle paid her PIP benefits and sought
reimbursement from the insurer of the moving vehicle. The insurer of the moving vehicle argued that the plain language of the statute required that benefits be paid only
when injury is "caused by physical contact with" a motor vehicle (FLA. STAT. §
627.736(4)(d) 4 (1971)), and no contact occurred between the moving vehicle and the
park bench-sitter. The Third District Court of Appeal held that the insurer of the moving vehicle should pay, reasoning that the No-Fault Act did not replace common law
concepts of causation, "particularly proximate causation." Id. at 460. The court said
the parked car was "in reality an extension of the [moving] car," and therefore the
proximate cause of the injury. Id. See also Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co. 356 So. 2d
1337 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), and Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 339 So. 2d
1164 (Fla. 2d Dist, Ct. App. 1976).
But cf.Feltner v. Harford Accident & Indemnity Co., 336 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) in which the Second District Court of Appeal held that injury
sustained by a man, who after driving a young woman home was struck across the face
with a piece of pipe by her irate father, who thought the man was a seducer, was not
injury "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of the car. The court did not
find a sufficient "causal connection between the use of the automobile and the attack."
Id. at 143.
52. 368 So. 2d at 349.

Published by NSUWorks, 1982

9

Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 3
250

Nova Law Journal

6:19821

Nov La2Juna5018

rectly contravened the holding in Heredia.53 In a footnote in Lumbermens, the court acknowledged that Heredia construed the word "insured" in the definition of "motor vehicle."54 But this acknowledgment
failed to distinguish Heredia, for in Heredia the court only construed
the word "insured" to reach the conclusion that the statutory term

"motor vehicle" included a commercial truck.55 Castagna's injury, like
Heredia's, was caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle (a commercial truck). The statutory definition of "motor vehicle" was satisfied
because the truck that struck Castagna was not used in the business of

the insured, Castagna, but rather in the business of its owner.
Assuming Heredia had precedential effect, the only issue in Lumbermens should have been whether Castagna was the occupant of a
"motor vehicle." Negron established that he was not. Negron permitted
the occupant of a conveyance which was not within the statutory defini-

post office tractor-trailer) to recover when
tion of "motor vehicle" (a
'56
vehicle."
"motor
a
by
hit
In view of Negron and Heredia, the Florida Supreme Court should
have either held for Castagna, or approved the holding in Camacho:
the Act does not apply when two commercial vehicles collide.57 Instead,
the Court discussed proximate cause, leaving the important issue
58
unclarified.
53. Recall that Heredia concluded that the pedestrian hit by a commercial vehicle had been hit by a "motor vehicle" because the vehicle was not used primarily in the
business of the insured, but rather used primarily in the business of the owner.
54. 368 So. 2d at 349 n.3. This footnote is the only acknowledgment the Lumbermens court makes in the Heredia decision. It states in part that "[t]he word 'insured'
has been held to refer only to insureds who are injured by physical contact within
Id.
I."
commercial vehicles, and not to owners of commercial vehicles .
55. See discussion of Heredia in text supra.
56. See discussion of Negron in text supra.
57. The appellant contended that the case fell under the no-recovery rule of
Camacho because the collision involved only commercial vehicles. 368 So. 2d at 350.
The opinion ignores this contention.
58. At the time of the decision, the legislature had amended the definition of
"motor vehicle" to expressly include commercial vehicles. See Ch. 78-374 § 2, 1978
Fla. Laws 1042. The court acknowledged the change in a footnote without any discussion of how the change should affect Castagna. 368 So. 2d at 349 n.3. Although the
court expressly stated it was construing FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) (1975), arguably,
the 1978 amendment was merely a clarification of prior law. See Williams v. Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co., 382 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980), where the court held that a
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Uninsured Vehicles
The uninsured vehicle cases can be divided into four categories: 1)
those determining the benefits due to children hurt in insured vehicles,
while living with parents who failed to insure the family car, 2) those
determining the benefits due persons injured while either driving, riding
in, or "occupying" uninsured cars, 3) those determining the benefits
due persons injured in an insured car who owned an uninsured car, and
4) those determining the benefits due persons who constructively
"owned" an uninsured car. Basic to these cases is the statutory requirement that one cannot recover PIP benefits from a stranger if one owns
an uninsured vehicle or is statutorily
entitled to insurance benefits from
59
a relative domiciled with him.
Cases in the first category stand for the proposition that children
injured while riding in others' insured vehicles can recover PIP benefits
in spite of their parents' failure to insure the family car. For example,
in Farley v. Gateway Insurance Co.,60 a child, riding in a car insured
by Gateway, was allowed to recover from Gateway, despite the fact
that he lived with his stepfather, who owned an uninsured car. Gateway argued that Farley's stepfather, by failing to insure, had become a
self-insurer under the Act.61 The court rejected Gateway's construction
1973 modification of section 627.727 of the Florida Statutes (dealing with uninsured
motorist coverage) was formal only, and "was intended by the legislature to clarify and
secure from doubt" pre-existing law. 382 So. 2d at 1220. In so doing, the court "disapproved" five cases inconsistent with the opinion. Id.
At the time of the Lumbermens decision, the legislature had also amended FLA.
STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)(1) to provide benefits for injury sustained "while occupying a

motor vehicle" or "while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle." See ch. 77-468
§ 33, 1977 Fla. Laws 2076. Although Castagna would not have fit into the category
"while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle" under the amended law, he would

have fit into the category "while occupying a motor vehicle" under the amended law,
since the definition of motor vehicle had been expanded to include commercial vehicles.

§ 627.736(4)(d)(4) (1979).

59.

FLA. STAT.

60.
61.

302 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
FLA. STAT. § 627.733(4) (1979) provides:

An owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required...
who fails to have such security in effect at the time of an accident shall
have no immunity from tort liability, but shall be personally liable for the
payment of benefits under § 627.736. With respect to such benefits, such
an owner shall have all of the rights and obligations of an insurer under §
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of the statute, reasoning that the "Act was intended to broaden insurance coverage. '2 The construction urged by Gateway would have reduced coverage.63 The court also rejected Gateway's argument that the
Act required Farley to look to his stepfather as an insurer,"6 reasoning
that the questioned provision of the Act was intended to prevent an
injured party from collecting insurance benefits twice: once from the
insurer of the car in which he was hurt, and ofice from the insurer of
his family car." The court pointed out that there would be no double
recovery for Farley. The court concluded that the legislature did not
intend
to acquiesce in the consequence of calamity to a relative [of one
who ought to have insured] when such relative is injured in or by a
stranger's automobile and can recover [from] the stranger's insurer
if the stepfather didn't even own an automobile. Farley should not
in effect be penalized just because his stepfather bought an automobile; and the obvious practicalities in these cases preclude a response that he, Farley, can always go against his stepfather if the
latter fails to procure insurance therefor.6"
Finally, the court observed that "insurer" is defined in the statute as
one in the business of selling insurance.6 7 Farley's stepfather was not in
§ 627.730-627.741
(emphasis added).
62. 302 So. 2d at 179 (emphasis in original).
63. Id.
64. Gateway argued FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)4b (1973):
(d) The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay ... for
4.. . . injury sustained ... by any person. . . while occupying the own-

er's motor vehicle. . . provided the injured person is not himself:
a. The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required
...or
b. Entitled to ... benefits from the insurer of the owner of such a motor

vehicle.
65. 302 So. 2d at 179.
66. Id.
67. Id. FLA. STAT. § 624.03 (1973). In State Farm Mut. v. Pierce, 383 So. 2d
1184 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the court cited Farley when it refused to make the
husband, the owner of an uninsured vehicle, a co-defendant with the insurance company sued for PIP benefits by his wife. The husband was not an insurer and could not
be made to share in payment of benefits.
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that business.
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Williams 8 is similar to Farley. Williams was injured while a passenger in an insured motor vehicle, and while residing in the household of a relative (her mother) who
owned an uninsured motor vehicle. The First District, like the Farley
court, allowed Williams to recover PIP benefits from the insurer of the
vehicle in which she was a passenger. Commercial Union's argument
that Williams' mother, by failing to insure her motor vehicle, had become a self-insurer 6 was rejected by the court, as it had been in Farley. Instead, the court concluded that Williams had the option of suing
70
either her mother, or, "if she prefers," Commercial Union.
In contrast, cases in the second category stand for the proposition
that persons injured while either driving, riding in or "occupying" uninsured cars cannot recover PIP benefits. For example, in State Farm
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kraver" Carolyn Kraver was driving an
uninsured Cadillac, registered and titled in her father's name,7 2 when
she collided with an automobile insured by State Farm. Carolyn argued
that she should recover PIP benefits from State Farm under the Farley
decision. The court disagreed, reasoning that the plain language of the
benefits section of the Act controlled.. 3

68. 309 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
69. Id. at 618.
70. Id. at 619. See also Gateway Ins. Co. v. Butler, 293 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) in which a child injured in a conveyance struck by a vehicle
insured by Gateway was allowed to recover PIP benefits from Gateway, despite the fact
that his father, in whose household he resided, owned an uninsured car.
The same result occurs when the child living in the household of a parent who
owns an uninsured car is struck by an insured vehicle. ,See Witko v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 348 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
71. 364 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
72. The court pointed out that the Cadillac was "purchased" by Carolyn
suggesting ownership might have been a latent issue. Id. at 1260. See FLA. STAT. §
627.736 (4)(d)4.a (Supp. 1976).
73. FLA STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) (1979) provides:
(d) The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal injury
protection benefits for:
4. Accidental bodily injury sustained in this state by any other
person [than the owner] while occupying the owner's motor
vehicle or, if a resident of this state, while not an occupant of
a motor vehicle or motorcycle, if the injury is caused by phys-
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Because Ms. Kraver was neither "occupying the [insured] owner's
motor vehicle"7 4 (she was not occupying the car insured by State
Farm) nor was she "not an occupant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle" 5 (for she was in her dad's Cadillac), she did not come within
the benefits provided by the statute.
The court found Farley inapplicable; 78 sound logic because Farley
was "occupying the [insured] owner's motor vehicle"77 and was not
himself "[the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security
is required," 78 although his stepfather was. Kraver was driving a vehicle which should have been insured and was not. Although both Farley
and Kraver were children of parents who failed to insure, Kraver was
old enough to know better-and she was driving. Farley was merely a
passenger, and in an insured car at that.
The decision in South Carolina Insurance Company v. Rodriguez7 9 is consistent with Kraver, but the result is inconsistent with the
policy of the Act. Rodriguez, injured when the uninsured motor vehicle
in which he was riding collided with a motor vehicle insured by South
Carolina Insurance Company, attempted to recover PIP benefits from
South Carolina Insurance Company. Rodriguez is distinguishable from
Farley, who sought benefits from the insurer of the vehicle in which he
was a passenger, and thus was clearly within the description of the benefits section of the statute." Rodriguez did not own a vehicle, nor did
he live with one who did. The Rodriguez court, relying on Kraver and
ical contact with such motor vehicle, provided the injured per-

son is not himself:
a. The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security
is required under §§ 627.730-627.741, or
b. Entitled to personal injury benefits from the insurer of the
owner of such a motor vehicle. (emphasis added.)
74. Id. at (4)(d)4.
75. Id. This use of double negatives is not bad grammar, but rather a close
tracking of the language of the statute. Recall that the court declined to limit benefits
of the Act to pedestrians. See the discussion of Negron in text supra.
76. 364 So. 2d at 1261.
77. FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (4)(d)4 a (1979).
78. Id.
79. 366 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
80. FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (4)(d)4 (Supp. 1978).
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the "clear dictates" of the statute,8" denied Rodriguez benefits. Presumably,8 2 Rodriguez was injured neither while "occupying the [insured] owner's motor vehicle"'8 3 nor "while not an occupant of a motor
vehicle," 84 thus he was not entitled to benefits. But there was no evidence that passenger Rodriguez was a relative of the uninsured owner
(contrasted with the plaintiff in Kraver who was driving her father's
Cadillac), nor that he had any control over the failure to insure (contrasted with Carolyn Kraver, who actually purchased the Cadillac, although it was registered in her father's name)85 Thus, Rodriguez fails
to effect the intent of the Act as stated in Farley: "to broaden insurance coverage while at the same time reasonably limiting the amount
of damages which could be claimed." '
Similarly, in Protective NationalInsurance Company of Omaha v.
Padron, 7 a passenger, Padron, was injured while riding in an an uninsured car. Padron, however, sought to recover from the insurer of the
driver of the car in which he was riding rather than the insurer of the
owner of the other car. The Third District Court of Appeal denied recovery, 88 reasoning that the driver's policy provided benefits only for
persons occupying the insured car,89 and the No-Fault Act only requires that the owner of a car purchase insurance, not the driver. 90 The
injured passenger did not have no-fault insurance of her own, 91 but
whether or not she owned a car was not disclosed. One who does not
own a car is not required to have PIP insurance.92 Indeed, one cannot
obtain no-fault protection without owning a car.93 Assuming the in81.

366 So. 2d at 169.

82.
83.

The decision is per curiam.
FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (4)(d)4. See language of statute at note 73 supra.

84. Id. See note 10 supra.
85. 364 So. 2d at 1260.
86. 302 So. 2d at 179.
87.
88.

310 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 328 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

in which an injured pedestrian was allowed to recover from the driver's insurer, despite
the owner's failure to insure.

89. 310 So. 2d at 433.
90. Id. at 434.
91. Id. at 433.
92. FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1979).
93.

See McClendon v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d Dist.
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jured passenger owned no car, it is not reasonable to deny her coverage
under the Act; the exception of those similarly situated warrants legislative and judicial attention. Remedial statutes should be broadly construed so as to achieve their remedial purpose. In enacting the NoFault Act, the legislature intended to reduce fault-based litigation and
to facilitate compensation of accident victims. Leaving a blameless auto
passenger to to her common law remedy does not further these goals.
Persons injured while "occupying" an uninsured car have been denied PIP benefits. In IndustrialFire and Casualty Insurance Company
v. Collier94 the court interpreted the word "occupying." Collier was
injured when changing the tire of his uninsured VW. His disabled vehicle was struck by another car, causing the VW to strike him. He applied for PIP benefits from Industrial, the insurer of his other car, who
denied benefits based on an exclusion in its policy which was authorized
by the Act. 5 The policy exclusion provided that coverage did not apply
while the insured was occupying a motor vehicle which he owned, but
had failed to insure under the policy. The policy defined "occupying" to
mean "in or upon, or entering into, or alighting from a motor vehicle."96 The appellate court found that Collier was "occupying" his VW,
and thus was excluded from coverage.97
Cases in the third category stand for the proposition that persons
injured while driving, or riding in an insured car, who own9" an uninCt. App. 1974). McClendon was injured driving another's uninsured auto. He applied
for PIP benefits from his own insurer under a non-owner policy issued to him. The
insurer was held not liable for PIP benefits because McClendon did not own a car, even
though his policy contained an uninsured motorist endorsement; presumably this coverage was available only upon a showing of fault. An insurer is not obligated to provide
no-fault benefits in a policy of insurance if the insured does not own a car. Id. at 23738.
94. 334 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
95. Id. at 149. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(2) provides: "AUTHORIZED EXCLUSIONS-Any insurer may exclude benefits: (a) For injury sustained by the named
insured .

.

. while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured and

not insured under the policy .... "
96. 334 So. 2d at 149-50.
97. Id. at 150. See also Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 339 So. 2d 1164, 1165
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
98. The owner of a motor vehicle must insure it. FLA. STAT. § 627.733(1)
(1979): "Every owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered and
licensed in this state shall maintain security as required by subsection (3) in effect
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sured car, will also be denied the PIP benefits of the Act.
In Whitaker v. Allstate Insurance Co.,9 9 Pam Whitaker did not
recover from Allstate because she owned an uninsured Porsche. She
lived with her sister and was injured while driving her sister's car, insured by Allstate. The court affirmed Allstate's refusal to pay PIP benefits based on the "unambiguous proviso" of Section 627.736(4)(d)3 of
the Act: "provided the relative. . . is not [herself] the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required. 10 0
Tapscott v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.101 involved a woman who was injured while driving her father's car. Her
action against her father's insurer failed because she was the owner of
a vehicle for which security was required under the Act, and her "estranged husband cancelled the insurance on her automobile."1 1 2 Thus
she was involuntarily excepted from the benefits provision of the Act.1 0 3

Because the security requirement is triggered by the requirement
that a vehicle be registered in the state, 10 ' Ms. Tapscott argued that
continuously throughout the registration or licensing period." In addition, one must
look to one's own insurer for PIP benefits, even if injured in another's insured auto. See
FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d) and Martinez v.'Old Security Cas. Co., 327 So. 2d 786
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Main Ins. Co. v. Wiggins, 349 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) interpreted the word "owner". The First District held that Wiggins,
who was injured while standing beside a motor vehicle he was leasing, was not an
"owner" because his lease did not include an option to purchase. Id. at 639. Because
Wiggins owned no other car, and because he lived with his daughter, he was allowed to
recover PIP benefits from his daughter's auto insurer. The decision is straightforward
enough-one who leases is not an "owner." But the fact that one who leases with an
option to purchase is an "owner" as specifically defined in FLA. STAT. § 627.732(2)
(1979) might well come as a surprise to an unwary lessee.
99. 363 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
100. Id. at 857. See also Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Bergouignan, 335
So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
101. 330 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
102. Id. at 476.
103. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)3(1979):
(d) The insurer . . .shall pay .. .for 3. Accidental bodily injury sus-

tained by a relative of the owner residing in the same household, under the
circumstances described in subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., provided
the relative at the time of the accident is domiciled in the owner's household and is not [herself] the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to
which security is required . ...

104. See Ochoa and Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 358 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla.
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her car was not required to be registered because it had been inoperable for four days due to clutch and transmission disorders. 10 5 The
court conceded that prior cases excluded "motor vehicles which are
neither operated over the public streets or highways of Florida nor
maintained for that purpose"10 6 from the required security provisions of
the Act, but found that Ms. Tapscott had not "abandoned her automobile as a means of transportation on public streets and highways."107
The insurance on her car was cancelled because. her husband abandoned her, not because she had abandoned her car. The court noted
that "[a]fter recovery from her injuries, appellant repaired and reinsured her car,"10 8 evidencing her intent to maintain the car.
An opposite outcome but one consistent with the result in Tapscott
was reached in Malen v. American States Insurance Co.109 Wayne
Malen owned an uninsured Mercedes Benz. He was injured driving Diane Loos' car, insured by American States. American States denied
coverage because Malen was "the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required.

."1110 On appeal, Malen recovered

because the court determined that his Mercedes was not a vehicle
"maintained for operation on the streets and highways .... "II pointing to the fact that it had been left unrepaired at a repair shop for six
months to be sold "as is."11 2 Thus, security was not required for his
Mercedes.1"'
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), Lopez v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 384 So. 2d 680, 681
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) and FLA. STAT. § 320.02(1) (1979).
105. 330 So. 2d at 476.
106. Id. at 477. The court cited Staley v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
328 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) and Kotich v. Criterion Ins. Co., 38 Fla.
Supp. 199 (C.C. Escambia Co. 1973).

107.

330 So. 2d at 477.

108.
109.
110.

Id.
376 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Id. American was arguing the exclusion from coverage provided by

STAT.

FLA.

§ 627.736(4)(d)4a (1975).

111. 376 So. 2dat474.
112. Id. at 473 citing Ward v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 375 So. 2d
898 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) and Tapscott.
113. See also Sherman v. Reserve Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977). Cf. Williams v. Leatherby, 338 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1976). Williams owned an uninsured car, but was injured driving a friend's car. The

court held the insurer not liable for PIP benefits, in spite of the fact that Williams'
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In Staley v. Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,114 Sta-

ley was injured while a passenger in a car insured by Florida Farm.
Staley owned an uninsured auto not involved in the accident. Staley

argued that he was entitled to PIP benefits from Florida Farm because
he, like Farley, was injured while a passenger in an insured vehicle.1 15
The court denied benefits, distinguishing Farley."'6 Unfortunately, in
distinguishing Farley, the court misreported it.117
The logical rationale for the outcome in Staley is the plain language of the statute, which expressly excludes benefits where the injured person is himself "the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to

auto had been inoperable and in storage for more than two months before the accident,
and was not repaired until after the accident. The court relied upon FLA. STAT. §
627.733(1) which requires every owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered to
maintain security on the motor vehicle. But the court failed to examine whether the
motor vehicle was "required to be registered," and declined to follow Staley v. Florida
Farm Bur. Ins. Co., discussed in text accompanying notes 114-119 infra. Id. at 72. (In
dictum, the Staley court had said: "Had appellant's motor vehicle been inoperable or
had it been in storage it would not have been a vehicle required to be registered and
licensed in Florida." 328 So. 2d at 243.) Apparently the Williams court was distracted
by the fact that the car had not been insured for a year prior to its inoperability. Id.
This shouldn't make any difference once the car is inoperable. The No-Fault Act sets
penalties for failure to insure, and denial of benefits where they are legally available is
not one of them.
114. 328 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
115. Id. at 243.
116. Id.
117. The Staley court said Farley was "conceivably 'entitled to collect personal
injury benefits from' his stepfather." 328 So. 2d at 243. This is error. The Farley court
expressly found that the stepfather was not an "insurer," and that "the obvious practicalities" precluded the response that Farley could go against his stepfather. 302 So. 2d
at 179. Further, the Staley court said that the policy of the Act in Farley is "to shift
the burden of Farley's injury not to his stepfather but to a compensated seller of automobile insurance." 328 So. 2d at 243. The Farley court found "the act was intended to
broaden insurance coverage while at the same time reasonably limiting the amount of
damages in which could be claimed," 302 So. 2d at 179, a policy statement in Staley's
favor, not against him. Furthermore, the Farley court found the "obvious reason" for
Section 627.736(4)(d)4b is "to prevent an injured party from receiving a windfall by
collecting benefits from the insurance carrier for the owner of a vehicle in which he is
riding at the time of the accident and at the same time collecting benefits from the
insurance carrier of another motor vehicle owner .
I." This interpretation too
Id.
would favor Staley's recovery.
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which security is required."""8 The best way to distinguish Farley from
Staley is also to refer to the plain language of the statute: Farley was
neither the owner of a motor vehicle, 119 nor entitled to PIP benefits
from the insurer of the owner.'2 0 If one is either, one is excluded from
benefits. Staley fit the first exclusion. Unspoken, but perhaps relevant
in Farley, is the fact that a child has no control over whether his parent
(stepfather) insures or not; Staley should have insured. Spoken, and
certainly very relevant in Farley, is the obvious practicality: a child
12
doesn't sue his stepfather. '
Constructively "Owned" Vehicles
The final category of cases, those determining the availabilty of
PIP benefits to those who constructively "own" an uninsured vehicle, is
118.

FLA. STAT.

119.

Id.

120.

FLA. STAT.

§ 627.736(4)(d)4a.

§ 627.736(4)(d)4b.

121. In contrast to the denial of PIP benefits in the above cases, persons have
been allowed to collect medical payments benefits from the insurer of the car in which
they were riding, in spite of failing to insure their own cars.
Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., and Johnston v. United Services Auto.
Ass'n, 364 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), consolidated for appeal, involved
passengers injured in separate accidents, each in an insured vehicle. Both passengers
owned automobiles which they had failed to insure, in contravention of the Act. The
appellate court found that the injured plaintiffs were entitled to the insurance benefits
they were seeking from the insurer of the owner of the vehicle in which they were
injured---"additional and optional medical payments coverage for which a separate premium was charged." Id. at 76. They were not seeking nor were they entitled to PIP
benefits. Id. In response to United Services' argument that it would be unfair to allow
Johnston to recover because he had violated the required security provision of the Act,
the court responded that the legislature had provided penalties for violation of the Act,
and it was not the court's role to fashion new ones, and that "between plaintiffs and
defendants, there is nothing unfair in requiring defendants to make payment of benefits
which they have contracted to pay under coverage for which they have been paid a
premium." Id. at 78. The court reminded the defendant that the purpose of provisions
in insurance contracts which restrict coverage when other insurance coverage is available is to avoid duplication of coverage, not to escape coverage altogether, as defendant
would do. The court warned that "[i]f an insurer intends to restrict coverage, it should
use language clearly stating its purpose," for "[w]here there are two interpretations
which may fairly be given to language used in a policy, the one that allows the greater
indemnity will govern." Id. at 77.
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perhaps the most disturbing in terms of outcome. These cases construe
the meaning of the phrase "named insured" in a policy of insurance in
order to impute constructive ownership of a vehicle. The holding of
each presents a disturbing result, at odds with consumers' reasonable
122
expectations regarding insurance coverage.

123
For example, in the consolidated cases of Rojas and Fonseca,
Mrs. Rojas' reasonable expectations were thwarted. Mrs. Rojas, driving
her husband's uninsured Oldsmobile, and Mrs. Fonseca, her passenger,
were injured in an accident. Mrs. Rojas sought PIP benefits and Mrs.
Fonseca sought liability benefits under a policy issued to Mrs. Rojas by

122. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3 (1971):
Insurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion, under which
the insured is left little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions offered to him, even when the standard forms are prescribed by public officials rather than insurers. .

.

. Regulation is relatively weak in most

instances, and even the provisions prescribed or approved by legislative or
administrative action ordinarily are in essence adoptions, outright or
slightly modified, of proposals made by insurers' draftsmen.
Moreover, the normal processes for marketing most kinds of insurance do
not ordinarily place the detailed policy terms in the hands of the policyholder until the contract has already been made ....
Thus, not only
should a policyholder's reasonable expectations be honored in the face of
difficult and technical language, but those expectations should prevail as
well when the language of an unusual provision is clearly understandable
unless the insurer can show that the policyholder's failure to read such
language is unreasonable.
It is important to note, however, that the principle of honoring reasonable expectations does not deny the insurer the opportunity to make an
explicit qualification effective by calling it to the attention of a policyholder at the time of contracting, thereby negating surprise to him.
Id. at 350-52. See also Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1978): "An insurer will not be allowed, by the use of obscure terms, to
defeat the purpose for which the policy was procured. . . . (Citing, Roberson v. United
Services Auto. Assn., 330 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976.) . . . If an insurer intends
to restrict coverage, it should use language clearly stating its purpose." Id. at 77. See
also Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981).
123. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Fonseca, and Rojas v. Fidelity and Cas.
Co. of N.Y., 358 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) cert. denied 365 So. 2d 711
(Fla. 1978).
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Fidelity. The policy covered Mrs. Rojas' Ford, and "a temporary substitute vehicle." Mrs. Rojas and Fonseca both argued that they were
injured in a temporary substitute vehicle and should therefore recover
from Fidelity, since Mrs. Rojas' Ford was out of service and under repair on the date of the accident.' 24 The appellate court found that
neither Mrs. Rojas nor Mrs. Fonseca could recover, 125 because Mr.
Rojas' Olds was not a "temporary substitute vehicle" which the policy
defined as a "non-owned" vehicle. 126 It was an "owned," rather than
"non-owned", vehicle because Mr. Rojas, by operation of the fine print,
was a "named insured" under the policy. His name didn't appear on
the policy, but because the policy defined "named insured" to include
the resident spouse of the named insured, ownership of the Olds was
imputed to Mrs. Rojas. 27 Thus coverage under the policy depended
upon the interrelationship of three separate definitions in the policy--"named insured," "non-owned," and "temporary substitute vehicle." By manipulating all these provisions, lawyers could retrospectively
determine what coverage was available.
Rojas is wrongly decided for two reasons: the clear and unambiguous language of the policy extends coverage, and the rationale underlying the decision fails to justify the denial of coverage.
The court focused on the wrong policy provision ("named insured") to reach its erroneous conclusion. The insuring clause in Mrs.
Rojas' policy obligated Fidelity to pay for damages arising out of the
"ownership, maintenance, or use of the owned automobile or any nonowned automobile.' 1 28 The court decided that since Mr. Rojas was a
"named insured" (defined in the policy to include a spouse who resided
in the same household), the Olds could not possibly be a "non-owned"
vehicle. But the court overlooked the clear and unambiguous definition
of an "owned" vehicle contained in the policy: a vehicle "for which a
specific premium charge indicates that coverage is afforded." 29 The
language of the policy defined a "non-owned" vehicle as one "not
124.
125.
insurance
126.
127.
128.
129.

358 So. 2d at 570.
The policy tied the availability of PIP benefits to the availability of liability
under the policy. Id. at 571 n.1.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
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owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured
or any relative, other than a temporary substitute automobile." 130 A
"temporary substitute automobile" was one "not owned by the named
insured, while temporarily used with the permission of the owner as a
substitute for the owned automobile.

. .

when withdrawn from normal

use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction."1 31
No premium was charged nor coverage afforded for the Olds. The
policy unambiguously defined a "non-owned" vehicle as one "not
owned:" a vehicle as to which no premium was paid. Rojas was indeed
a named insured. But payment of benefits depended on the definition of
"owned" and "non-owned," not upon the definition of "named insured." Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Rojas "owned" the Olds, because the
that
policy gave a very specific definition to the word "owned," and
1 32
definition was incorporated into the definition of "non-owned. ,
This technical construction is a fitting response to Fidelity's argument that the policy is "clear and unambiguous. 1 33 To see the fallacy
of the insurer's argument, one need only examine the rationale underpinning the court's interpretation of the insurance policy provisions at
issue in this case. The court said that the inclusion of both spouses in
the definition of named insured "was intended to protect the insurer
from assuming risks for which premium payments were not elicited in
situations where such risks were likely to eventuate." 14 But in this
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. The court did not focus on the definition of "non-owned" as "furnished for
the regular use of either the named insured or any other relative."
133. 358 So. 2d at 574.
134. Id. at 575. Historically, the inclusion of both spouses as "named insureds"

in the omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy was intended to protect the
insured, not the insurer. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.7 (1971) (Omnibus
Clauses Generally):
Perhaps the major objective underlying the development of omnibus
clauses has been to serve the interests of the insurance purchaser (usually
the named insured) in having the benefits of the coverage extend to certain
other persons as well as himself-persons who are natural objects of his
concern.
A second objective-to serve the interests of potential victims of incidents to which the insurance coverage applies-has been at most a subsidiary influence in the voluntary expansion of coverage through omnibus
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case, a premium was elicited for injury in a temporary substitute vehicle, which is precisely the risk that eventuated. Coverage under these
facts is precisely what the insured would have expected she was paying
for, whether her "loaner" came from her neighbor, her mechanic or, as
in this case, her spouse. The court feared that if the definition of named
insured did not include the spouse, "two or more vehicles could be covered by payment of a single premium."135

Ironically, in Boyd v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co.,138
which the Rojas court relied upon, two premiums were paid to two
different companies, one covering Mr. Boyd's car, and one covering
Mrs. Boyd's."' "The [Boyd] court acknowledged the incongruity of the
fact that the husband would be covered in almost any car in the world
which he drove with the owner's permission except that of his wife." 1
Rojas repeats the irony, yet fails to recognize that this very incongruity
defeats the reasonable expectations of the consumer with regard to the
scope of coverage. 139

clauses, but it has been a primary influence upon legislation requiring or
encouraging the inclusion of omnibus clauses in liability insurance
coverages.
Id. at 221-22.
See also § 2.11(b) (The definition of Insured):
In general, an omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy extends the definition of "insured" to persons using the automobile with permission. The earlier forms of omnibus clauses required that the permission
be that of the named insured, express or implied.
The 1955 revision broadened the definition of "insured" to include the
spouse of the insured even without proof of permission and any other person using the vehicle with the spouse's permission.
Id. at 76.
135. 358 So. 2d at 575.
136. 256 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971) reh. denied (1972).
137. Id. at 2.
138. 358 So. 2d at 572. Cf. Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Bergouignan,
335 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) in which the court held that a passenger
injured in an insured vehicle could not recover PIP benefits because he owned an uninsured vehicle. But the court allowed his spouse who was injured in the same car to
recover. Either their policy did not define "named insured" to include a spouse, or the
court chose to ignore such a definition.
139. The court also failed to see the implicit hostility to the married state contained therein. For a case in which the Florida Supreme Court urged the importance of
marriage, see Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979).
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The result in Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Jones140 is equally disturbing. Calvin Jones was injured while driving
his mother's uninsured car. Jones resided with his mother and stepfather. He sought PIP benefits from Industrial, the insurer of his stepfather's car. Industrial denied payment based on language in its policy.
The policy excluded coverage of any relative of the "named insured"
while occupying a motor vehicle "of which the named insured is the
owner and which is not an insured motor vehicle under this insurance. ' ' 141 The court said Calvin's stepfather "owned" Calvin's mother's
uninsured car, not in fact, but by operation of the definition of "named
insured" in the policy. 42 The court reached this conclusion despite the
fact that the policy defined "named insured" more broadly than the
Act defined "named insured. '1 43 The court found its interpretation necessary to prevent "the ridiculous result of allowing the insurance of one
automobile and the coverage on several unnamed automobiles. 1 4 4 The

140. 363 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
141. Id. at 1169.
142. Id. at 1170. Cf.Lopez v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 384 So. 2d 680, 681
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Fidelity argued that coverage should be denied under
the provision of the Act which authorizes the insurer to exclude benefits for injury
sustained by a relative of the named insured, residing in the same household, while
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named insured but not insured under
the policy. The court found the exclusion inapplicable because Rodriguez did not
"own" the vehicle occupied by Lopez. Because Lopez was not Rodriguez's spouse (he
was his son), he was not caught in the ensnaring definition of "owner" which caught
the plaintiffs in Jones and Fonseca.
143. Id. The policy defined "named insured" to include the policy holder or the
spouse of the policyholder. Id. Section 627.732 (1977) defined "named insured" as "a
person, usually the owner of a vehicle, identified in a policy by name as the insured
under the policy." Id. Cf.Cavalier Ins. Corp. v. Myles, 347 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1977): It is axiomatic that the provisions of statutes relating to insurance
become a part of any policy issued in the state, and that if the terms of a policy are
susceptible of differing interpretations, the interpretation which sustains the claim for
indemnity or which allows the greater indemnity will be adopted. Id. at 1062 citing
Dorfman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
Cf Andriakos v. Cavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977):
"[I]nsurance policy . . .will be enforced as if it were in compliance with the Act
regardless of its actual terms."
144. 363 So. 2d at 1170. Here the court cited Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v.
Fonseca, 358 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) for authority. Ironically, Fonseca had paid for insurance on a "temporary substitute vehicle," but when injured in a
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court also observed that "as a practical matter an insurance company
may include as a named insured a policyholder's 'spouse' [without actually naming the spouse on the policy] for the simple reason that a
policyholder (especially in this day and age) is not apt to have the same
1' 45
spouse at any given point in time.'
The court appears to confuse matters of administrative convenience with matters of policy. 4 The Jones court relied upon its former
decision in Rojas, in which it opined that the inclusion of both spouses
within the definition of "named insured" protects the insurer "from assuming risks for which premium payments were not elicited in situations where such risks were likely to eventuate."' 4 7 But the court overlooked the fact that in Rojas the insured paid a premium for coverage
in a temporary substitute vehicle and did not receive the expected coverage.148 While protection of the profits of the insurer is a worthy concern, in Jones that protection comes at the expense of an injured child,
who had no control over whether or not his parents properly insured.
As the Farley court recognized, "obvious practicalities" prevent a suit
against the parent.' 49 The result in these cases encourages insurance
companies to define terms in ways that the consumer would not expect,
and in ways which offend the purposes of the Act. The policy exclusion
at issue here presents a booby-trap for the unwary consumer.
Conclusion
Florida courts have extended the coverage of the No-Fault Act to
those injured in vehicles which were not statutorily defined "motor vehicles." This desirable result furthered the purposes of the Act. But the
supreme court erred in Lumbermens. It should have extended coverage
to one injured in an accident involving two commercial vehicles. In
view of the subsequent amendment of the Act to expressly include com-

car she was driving as a substitute for her own auto, which was being repaired, she
recovered nothing in exchange for the premium she had paid.
145. 363 So. 2d at 1170 n.1.
146. It also undermines the marital harmony for which the supreme court expressed great concern in Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979).
147. 358 So. 2d at 575.
148. See discussion of Rojas in text, supra.
149. 302 So. 2d at 179.
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mercial vehicles, this injustice should not recur.
The courts have extended the coverage of the Act to children injured in or by insured vehicles despite the fact that their parents owned
an uninsured car. This result is consistent with the purposes of the Act.
The courts have denied the coverage of the Act to injured persons who
actually own an uninsured car. The Act requires owners to purchase
personal injury protection insurance, and it is reasonable to expect and
require those who own cars to comply. But it is not reasonable to exclude from the Act's benefits those persons who do not own an auto,
and thus have no opportunity to insure. If such a person is injured in an
uninsured car, recovery of no-fault benefits from the insured driver, or
from the insured owner of another car involved in the accident, should
be permitted. This result would further the purposes of the Act without
undermining the required insurance provision of the Act. The courts'
failure to extend coverage on these facts is out of keeping with the
purposes of the Act.
Finally, the imputation of constructive ownership of uninsured
vehicles to spouses, thus denying the benefits of the Act to them, is a
surprising and unfair result. This development is the most inimical to
the purposes of the Act. It will eventually undermine the Act, for it
invites drafting of insurance policies which avoid the Act's required
benefits.
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